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Abstract
Besides the renowned biologist, Richard Dawkins, Dennett is amongst the first to be cognizance of the importance of memes,
making it central in the formulation of a Dennettian theory of consciousness. The importance of m
consciousness is flawed. It raises difficult and thorny issues that could not be easily resolved and h
theorizing of consciousness generally.
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1. Introduction
Besides
concerned, without language, culture and memes, his theory would be like automobiles without wheels. Dennett
believes that one of the most important innovations in evolutionary history crucial for the birth of Homo Sapiens
and the spread of cultures and civilizations was the invention of language. Dennett argues that the dawn of language
provides the ground for the onset of another wave of evolutionary revolution through the birth of memes. 
According to Dennett, along the evolutionary path of human acquisition of language, there comes a time when
vocalization becomes an important component of communication, from which humans began to recognize the
virtues of self-stimulation by talking and asking oneself questions, as if it is drawing and writing to oneself.  This is
important (innovation) as it advances new and novel ways in which cognitive systems could be enhanced through
virtual wirings that weld up subsystems not hardwired in the brain [11].  These spread and creation of memes are,
however, not possible without the invention of language.  So, the discovery of both memes and language bestow 
powerful leverage that confers tremendous advantage of flexibility to the discovery of new design space, as well as
accelerating by many order of magnitudes the rate of evolution of the human minds [12].
2. Evolution of Consciousness
consciousness.  The function of memes to cultural evolution is largely similar to that of genes to biological
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evolution.  Genes alter phenotypes that natural selection acts upon via its impact on the genotypes. Similarly, memes 
cause cultural change  the equivalent of biological evolution but in different medium - through memetic evolution 
in the mind (the way genes evolve in cells) via the processes of natural selection. Hence, both genes and memes 
observe similar laws but act on different medium [11].  
Perhaps the identification of memes with genetic evolution is not too surprising, as arguably, they are merely 
different manifestation of evolution. However, Dennett gives it a novel twist by claiming that mind, or 
consciousness for that matter, is a product of cultural evolution [11, 13] by virtue of memes since it is via the 
evolution of memes that culture evolves. In other words, human mind is an artifact created by memetic evolution. 
Memes continuously compete to ensure their continuous replication in the memetic pool. As they do so, the mind - 
the breeding place of memes - is continuously restructured, in other words evolves.    
Besides seeing human mind and consciousness as resulting from meme creation [15], Dennett also sees it as a 
sort of Von Neuman serial (virtual) machine running on a parallel hardwired brain. So, the mind is a software to the 
hardware brain analogous to the function of the computer software to its hardware counterpart. It is virtual 
(machine) because different programming rules engender different computational power and thus performing 
different functions whilst running on the same computer. Through eons of sifting and fine-tuning (by natural 
selection), it has produced hardwired parallel brain structure in proto-humans. However, it is only through various 
processes of auto-stimulation and the likes by virtue of memes interactions in memosphere that generate various 
dispositions and habits of mind [11]. As a consequence of the resulting soft-wiring, which in turn creates virtual 
machine on hardwired brain that were not originally designed to perform such functions. In fact, the parallel brain 
was primarily designed to perform some primitive physical-behavioral related survival functions, but which was 
later empowered and transformed in magical ways with the embodiment of the software [11]. According to Dennett, 
consciousness is a manifestation of software programming but not the upshot of parallel hardware brain for the 
following reasons: 
 
i. it is too recent an innovation to be hard-wired into innate machinery;  
 
ii. it is largely a product of cultural evolution that gets imparted to brains in early training; and 
 
iii. its successful installation is determined by myriad micro-settings in the plasticity of the  brain, which means 
that its functionally important features are very likely to be invisible to neuroanatomical scrutiny in spite of the 
extreme salience of the effects [11].          
 
-embracing, because any machine or anything at all (for that matter) is fully conscious 
insofar as it has the virtual machine as a major component in its system. Apparently, the mere presence of a Joycean 
machine constitutes both necessary and sufficient condition for the possession of a full- blown consciousness. Inert 
make-ups of the hardware is hardly the issue, as it makes no difference whether it is robotic or biologically 
constituted.  As Dennett forcefull
has such a virtual machine as its control systems is conscious in the fullest sense, and is conscious because it has 
 
 
3. Memes and Consciousness 
D
details of connection on which their prowess depends. But the most striking differences in human prowess depend 
on microstructural differences (still inscrutable to neuroscience) induced by the various memes that have entered 
bridge meme and culture to consciousness. It clearly demonstrates how memes could make a difference to the 
emergence of consciousness in humans  
- the way non-human animals would be impoverished without it.   
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But what on earth are memes? According to Dennett, they are essentially ideas (see, for instance [12] [10] [17] 
[4]. In ot
system or computational architectu
impotence of meaning; the brain is first and foremost a syntactic engine, which can be fruitfully viewed as realiably 
mimicking a semantic engine, but in which meanings themselves never overrule, overpower, or so much as 
influence the brute mechanistic or syntactic flow of local causation in the nervous system. (A semantic engine, I 
claim, is a mechanistic impossibility  like a perpetual motion machine, but a useful idealization in setting the specs 
 
On the one hand, given his allegiance of the third person, Dennett is eager to denounce meanings and the likes. 
this software to the hardware brain. Dennett discovers it in memes (which, on his account, is nothing else but 
semantics), for he believes consciousness is of too recent innovation to be hard-wired, which explains, in part, why 
he chooses to rely so much on the onset of meme and culture to do the microstructural fixation, as they certainly 
have a legacy of much recent origin [11]. But on closer scrutiny, this appears a grave tactical miscalculation. It 
[18] for its continuous disseminations. 
4. Conclusion 
consequences. Something has to g
incongruity strikes the heart of his theory.  Though this is a brief review, it echoes wide and deep repercussions on 
 
Endnotes 
1 For more comprehensive theoretical discussions on memes, see [11] [12] [16] and [1].  It is also worth looking at 
 
2 
 other 
selection pressure over the last six million years or so, and (2) these features make possible an enormous 
elaboration of powers that accrue from the sharing of Design wealth through cultural transmission. The pivotal 
 
3 
when mem
[11]. 
4 ure, and language has opened up new regions of Design Space 
shaping the structures of a virtual machine that turn the brain into a mind. They are responsible for the 
disciplining, developing and constraining  or in other words the creation of  unique software that perpetually 
recreates itself.  
5 . 
 
6 
theory will take. It is obvious that there are patterns of cultural change  evolution in the neutral sense  and any 
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sense of being consistent with the theory of evolution by natural sele  
7 
very feature that has been seen to recommend functionalism over cruder brands of materialism  its abstractness 
and 
systems  permits a functionalist theory, however realistically biological or humanoid in flavor, to be instantiated 
not only by robots (an acceptable or even desirable consequence in the eyes of some), but by suprahuman 
 
8 le of instructing, not protein 
synthesis as genes do, but behavior. However, genes can do that too indirectly through protein synthesis. On the 
other hand, meme replication, by involving neurostructural modifications, is invariably associated with the 
indu  
9 As observed in the earlier section, to Dennett, anything that possesses the virtual machine is in the full sense 
v
transmission medium for innovations is important for understanding the sources of design of human 
contribute remarkable design enhancements to the underlying 
 contribute to the making of mind 
the vehicles of language, they swiftly become parasitized by entities that have evolved to thrive in just such a 
 
10 
syntactic property or system of properties but a semantic property or system of properties: the story, not the text; 
objects, once we have adopted 
hence, memes are also naturally conceived as an application of the intentional stance (see, for instance, Dennett 
[18] that needless to say, also carry with it all the spurious baggage that comes with taking the stance. 
11 -variety that could 
y syntactical 
-physical, non-robotic 
happen, so they cannot 
5]. 
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